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CRIMINAL LAW
LOST IN TRANSLATION: DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, “THE PERSONAL IS
POLITICAL,” AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
KIMBERLY D. BAILEY ∗
Current criminal justice domestic violence policies have been severely
criticized by some feminist scholars as undermining victim autonomy. This
criticism is puzzling given the fact that these policies were drafted in
response to the activism of feminists involved in the early battered women’s
movement and that autonomy, or the agency of women, was a key goal of
this movement. This apparent paradox can be explained, however, by the
fact that activists involved in the early battered women’s movement and
actors in the current criminal justice regime speak in two different
“languages.” Thus, victim autonomy is a concept that got lost in the
translation of some of the goals of the early battered women’s movement
into criminal justice policy. While this Article acknowledges that victim
autonomy is not the chief goal of the criminal justice system, it still urges
proponents of current criminal justice policies to take seriously the fact that
a high number of victims currently do not want to engage with the criminal
justice system. This number is an important metric in analyzing the
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effectiveness of domestic violence policies. First, it underscores the fact
that improvements need to be made in victims’ interactions with the
criminal justice system and in the criminal justice system’s response to
those victims who do ask for help. Second, it highlights the fact that the
criminal justice system is a limited tool in addressing what is a social,
political, and economic problem. For this reason, a criminal justice
solution should be part of broader domestic violence policies that address
the complexity of this issue. The economic disparities that women
experience as a class and the intersectionality of race, class, sexuality, and
gender are important aspects of a broader approach to the domestic
violence problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the difficulties of language translation is that it is impossible to
capture perfectly the meaning that is signified by the words in one language
in the words of another. A good translation will serve utilitarian purposes
in that basic concepts are communicated between parties. Yet, it is often
the case that a word in one language does not have a perfect counterpart in
another language, and it is inevitable that certain nuances and cultural
meanings get lost in the translation process. A similar phenomenon has
occurred with respect to domestic violence policy. Specifically, the current
debate regarding domestic violence criminal justice policies underscores the
difficulties of translating the vision of the early battered women’s
movement into the “language” of the criminal justice system.
Current criminal justice domestic violence policies have been severely
criticized by some feminist scholars as disregarding victim autonomy. 1
This critique is puzzling given the fact that feminist activism within the
women’s liberation movement was a driving catalyst in the creation of a
criminal justice response to domestic violence 2 and that one of the
important goals expressed in this movement was the autonomy of women. 3
1

See, e.g., Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence
Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001); Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy
Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence
Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 741 (2007).
2
See infra Part II.A.
3
See infra Part II.A. I define “autonomy,” or what some call “agency,” as a person’s
ability to have decisionmaking authority in her life, even if under constrained circumstances.
See infra Part II for further discussion. While the concept of autonomy has been the subject
of much debate within feminist scholarship, see infra note 124, the general advocacy for
decisionmaking authority in women’s lives can be found throughout feminist literature
discussing the issues of rape reform and abortion. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape,
Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 359–60 (1993) (discussing the
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Indeed, feminists involved in the early battered women’s movement, which
evolved from the women’s liberation movement, 4 did see a place for victim
autonomy within domestic violence policy and initially envisioned that
victims would determine when the criminal justice system would intervene
when they experienced violence in their personal lives. 5 Those scholars
who currently advocate for more victim autonomy in criminal justice
policy, therefore, speak in the same language as those activists involved in
the early battered women’s movement. The reality is, however, that this
early vision of victim autonomy is simply not translatable within the
context of the current American criminal justice regime. Crime is viewed
as a violation against the state, not just the victim. Thus, the concept of
complete victim autonomy does not have much meaning within the criminal
justice system, and victim autonomy is not the primary priority of the
current criminal justice response to domestic violence.
This Article argues, however, that acknowledging that victim
autonomy is not the chief priority of criminal justice policies does not mean
that proponents of these policies should not be concerned about the fact that
so many domestic violence victims currently do not want to engage with the
criminal justice system. It has been estimated that as many as sixty to
eighty percent of domestic violence victims ultimately either recant their
testimony or refuse to testify altogether against their batterers. 6 Moreover,
it is believed that domestic violence is underreported. 7 For this reason,
there are probably many women who do not report their abuse to the
authorities at all. The limited number of domestic violence victims who
actually engage with the criminal justice system is an important metric in
determining the effectiveness of this system.

effort in rape law reforms to protect female sexual autonomy); Linda R. Hirshman, Bronte,
Bloom, and Bork: An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 205–
06 (1988) (defining the issue of abortion as an autonomy issue). More controversially, some
feminists have advocated for the legalization of prostitution and pornography on autonomy
grounds. See Beverly Balos, The Wrong Way to Equality: Privileging Consent in the
Trafficking of Women for Sexual Exploitation, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 163–64 (2004)
(discussing the feminist debate on prostitution); Anita Bernstein, Better Living Through
Crime and Tort, 76 B.U. L. REV. 169, 182 n.48 (1996) (discussing the feminist-libertarian
approach to pornography).
4
See infra Part II.A.
5
See infra Part II.A.
6
EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 87 (1996); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV.
747, 751 (2005).
7
DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 218 (1995); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991).
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Part II of this Article will discuss the inherent difficulty in translating
some of the goals of the early battered women’s movement into criminal
justice policy. It will first discuss how the women’s liberation movement
was an important catalyst in changing the perception that domestic violence
is a private matter that should be resolved in the home. Arguing that the
“personal is political,” activists convincingly made the case that domestic
violence is actually a political issue that requires political solutions. This
activism led to the battered women’s movement, and early activists initially
envisioned that victims would have autonomy in determining when the
criminal justice system would intervene in their lives. While this concept of
victim autonomy made sense in the context of the battered women’s
movement, it got lost in the translation of the early battered women’s
movement’s activism into current criminal justice policy, which is primarily
focused on prosecution and punishment. 8
Part III will then argue that although complete victim autonomy is not
the primary focus of the criminal justice system, proponents of current
domestic violence policies should still be concerned about the large number
of women who do not engage with the criminal justice system. This
number is an important metric in determining the effectiveness of this
system in addressing this problem. This Part will first make the case that
the criminal justice system is an important component of domestic violence
policies. It then argues that the high number of victims who do not want to
engage with the criminal justice system highlights the need for
improvement in the interactions that victims have with the criminal justice
system and in the level of responsiveness that this system has to victims
when they do ask for help. This Part further argues that the lack of
engagement of victims highlights the fact that criminal justice solutions
must be part of broader domestic violence policies that address the social,
political, and economic aspects of this issue. Addressing the economic
disparities of women as a class and the intersectionality of race, class,
sexuality, and gender are important aspects of these broader policies.
While developing a global solution to the problem of domestic
violence is beyond the scope of this article, Part IV offers some
considerations for future reform. It offers examples of jurisdictions that
provide some models for improving upon domestic violence victims’
experiences with the criminal justice system. This Part also recommends
that empirical studies that suggest that not all intimate violence fits the
8

It has been argued that current criminal justice policies are quite consistent with
dominance feminism, which values safety and perpetrator accountability over autonomy.
See Goodmark, supra note 1, at 4–5. Rather than focusing on a particular strand of
feminism, however, this Article focuses on the goals of the early battered women’s
movement.
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Coercive Controlling Violence model be used to inform future domestic
violence policy. Finally, this Part cautions that regardless of the activism of
early feminists, many victims still view the violence that they experience in
their homes as a private matter. This viewpoint also needs to be
incorporated into future domestic violence policy.
II. THE INHERENT DIFFICULTY IN TRANSLATING THE BATTERED
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT INTO CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY
A. THE FEMINIST DECONSTRUCTION OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE
DICHOTOMY AND THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT

The current focus of domestic violence law and policy on the criminal
justice system is a recent phenomenon. By 1920, wife beating 9 was illegal
in all states, 10 yet for decades the police and prosecutors did very little to
enforce these laws. 11 Because domestic violence was viewed as a private
matter, victims got very limited responses to their cries for help; if the
police responded to them at all, the typical response was to separate the
parties involved and to try to act as a peacemaker, rather than to make an
arrest. 12
This perspective that the state should play a minimal role in regulating
matters within the family unit is linked to the public/private dichotomy
described by John Locke and advocated by other liberal theorists.13
According to these theorists, the state’s role is to protect people and their
property while guaranteeing maximum freedom from interference from the
state and others. 14 Because individuals often have competing interests,
liberal theorists assert that the state has a legitimate role in regulating the
public sphere and individuals consent to such regulation as participating
9

Anglo-American common law provided that a husband could subject his wife to
corporal punishment or “chastisement” with the only limitation being that he could not
inflict permanent injury. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as a Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2122–23 (1996).
10
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1996).
11
Siegel, supra note 9, at 2170–71.
12
Id.
13
Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 283–84 (Stanley I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983). In this
context, the term “public” means the areas of life that are legitimate for state regulation; the
term “private” refers to the areas of life where state regulation is deemed illegitimate.
ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 34 (1983). Generally speaking,
liberal theorists believe that every person has “intrinsic and ultimate value” and that political
institutions must be constructed in ways that prevent the subordination of one person to the
will or judgment of others. Id. at 33.
14
JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 33.
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members of society. 15 In order to maximize one’s autonomy and ability for
self-fulfillment, however, the state should limit its regulation of the private
sphere, which includes matters related to the home and the family. 16
Arguing that “the personal is political,” feminist scholars and activists
have taken a variety of approaches in critiquing this so-called dichotomy
between the public and private and in demonstrating that making such a
division can have harmful effects on women. The phrase “the personal is
political” first originated as the title of an essay written by Carol Hanisch in
In this essay, Hanisch criticized those who characterized
1970. 17
consciousness-raising groups 18 as “personal” therapy sessions. 19 She
argued that this characterization suggested that women are to blame for
their so-called personal problems in the home and that these women must
change themselves as a solution to these problems. 20 Instead, Hanisch
insisted that there are political explanations not only for women’s situation
in the public sphere, but also for their situation inside of the home. 21
Hanisch argued, “Women are messed over, not messed up! We need to
change the objective conditions, not adjust to them.” 22 Thus, the feminist
critique of the public/private dichotomy seeks to deconstruct the liberal
notion that the home is a personal and non-political sphere.
First, some have noted that it is simply false to even suggest that the
state has not always regulated the so-called private sphere. In fact, the law
and social norms have always both defined and regulated contract, property,
marriage, divorce, and child custody. 23 Frances Olsen has argued:
Supporters of nonintervention [of the state in family matters] insist that the state
protect families from third-party interference . . . . Once the state undertakes to
prevent such third-party action, the state must make numerous policy choices, such as
what human grouping constitutes a family and what happens if parents disagree.
These choices are bound to affect the decisions people make about forming families,
the distribution of power within the family, and the assignment of tasks and roles
among family members. The state is responsible for the background rules that affect
15

Id. at 34.
Id.
17
Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR:
WOMEN’S LIBERATION 76 (Shulamith Firestone ed., 1970).
18
Consciousness-raising groups were small meetings where women met to discuss their
common experiences. For further discussion, see infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text.
19
Hanisch, supra note 17, at 76.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 76–77.
22
Id. at 76.
23
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 835, 842–44 (1985); see also Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law,
Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1255–56
(2009) (arguing that criminal law has always regulated family life).
16
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people’s domestic behaviors. Because the state is deeply implicated in the formation
and functioning of families, it is nonsense to talk about whether the state does or does
not intervene in the family. 24

Furthermore, some critique the public/private dichotomy as stemming
from an idealized male view of the home as a place to retreat from the stress
of the outside world and the natural place where one can maximize one’s
self-fulfillment. Instead of being a place to maximize their self-fulfillment,
however, the home has historically been a place of subordination of
women. 25 Thus, radical feminists 26 such as Catharine MacKinnon argue
that the personal interactions that women have in the home are political
because the domination of women appears in every area of their lives.27 To
these feminists, all interactions between men and women are
institutionalized relationships of power that are appropriate for political
analysis. 28 Male power is exercised in the home through the marital
relationship and the distribution of housework and child-rearing. 29 These
feminists eschew “[t]he assumption that these institutions and practices are
‘natural,’ or of purely individual concern.”30 Instead, this notion of a
private sphere “is shown to be an ideological curtain that conceals the
for
many
reality of women’s systematic oppression.” 31 Furthermore,
women, their subordination is reinforced by rape and other forms of
physical and emotional violence. 32 Women and children will not
adequately be protected, therefore, if the public/private distinction is drawn
in such a way that the relations between family members are not regulated
by the state. 33 Moreover, by not intervening, the state is complicit in this
violence:
When clerks in a local court harass a woman who applies for a restraining order
against the violence in her home, they are part of the violence. Society is organized to
permit violence in the home; it is organized through images in mass media and
through broadly based social attitudes that condone violence . . . . Some police
24

Olsen, supra note 23, at 837.
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 129 (1989).
26
Radical feminists are associated with the belief that the root of all systems of
oppression is the oppression of women. JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 84. Their goal has been
described as “uncovering and eradicating the systematic or root causes of women’s
oppression.” Id. For examples of theorists who are considered to be radical feminists, see
ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING (1974); SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX
(1970); CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
27
JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 101; MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 193–94.
28
JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 101; MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 193–94.
29
JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 101; MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 193–94.
30
JAGGAR, supra note 13, at 101.
31
Id.; see also MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 193–94.
32
MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 193–94.
33
See id.; OKIN, supra note 25, at 129.
25
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officers refuse to respond to domestic violence . . . . Some clerks and judges think
domestic violence matters do not belong in court. These failures to respond to
domestic violence are public, not private, actions. 34

This complicity suggests “that women are not important enough to merit
legal regulation.” 35
In addition to noting how the veil of privacy around the home keeps
women unsafe and vulnerable, MacKinnon also argues that the personal is
political because the production/public sphere is intimately connected to the
reproductive/private sphere. 36 MacKinnon points out how women literally
produce the labor pool through reproduction. 37 She also notes that male
workers traditionally have been able to focus on work outside of the home
because they have women performing unpaid work in the home. 38
Furthermore, discrimination in the public sphere keeps women poor and
socially dependent on men in the private sphere.39 As Deborah L. Rhode
has articulated, “Public opportunities shape private choices just as private
burdens constrain public participation. Women’s unequal responsibilities in
the home limit options in the world outside it. Reduced earning capacity in
the market also correlates with reduced power and increased obligations in
the family.” 40
Thus, the dynamics in the public and private spheres reinforce one
another. Carole Pateman characterizes the feminist critique of the
public/private dichotomy this way:
Feminists have emphasized how personal circumstances are structured by public
factors, by laws about rape and abortion, by the status of ‘wife’, by policies on
childcare and the allocation of welfare benefits and the sexual division of labour in the
home and workplace. ‘Personal’ problems can thus be solved only through political
means and political action. 41

Pateman acknowledges that for some radical feminists, “the personal is
political” literally means that there is no distinction between public and
private life, or that there should be no distinction between the two.42 But
34

Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and
Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 71–72 (1990).
35
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 978 (1991).
36
MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 66–68.
37
Id. at 66.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 168.
40
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (1994); see
also MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 168–70; OKIN, supra note 25, at 123.
41
Pateman, supra note 13, at 295.
42
Id.; see also MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 191 (“For women the measure of the
intimacy has been the measure of the oppression. This is why feminism has had to explode
the private. This is why feminism has seen the personal as the political. The private is
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for many feminists, the critique of the public/private dichotomy mainly
seeks to stress the interrelatedness of the public and private spheres. 43
During the 1960s and 1970s, the methodology used for making the
personal political was the consciousness-raising group. 44 These groups
were small gatherings of women where participants discussed their personal
everyday experiences: 45 “Springing up spontaneously in the context of
friendship networks, colleges and universities, women’s centers,
neighborhoods, churches, and shared work or workplaces, they were truly
grassroots.” 46 Through the discussion of their personal experiences,
participants in these groups began to see similarities in their experiences
and the systematic way that women were treated in society. 47 Thus,
through this sharing these women discovered the political nature of their
private lives and relationships. 48 This discovery removed the isolation that
many women felt in their lives and led the way to action and
empowerment. 49
For example, a victim of domestic violence who is isolated from those
who are outside of the home may easily personalize the violence she may
be experiencing. She may think that her partner has hit her because she is
not a good wife or mother. She may think that she may be able to stop the
violence in her home if she works on improving these personal
shortcomings. If, however, she engages in a discussion with other women
who also share their stories of abuse, she is no longer isolated and she may
then see that the problem is much larger than her experience. She may see
friends who are unquestionably good cooks who are also being beaten. She
may see friends who she believes are undoubtedly good mothers who are
also being beaten. She may begin to see that the abuse is not about her
public for those for whom the personal is political. In this sense, for women there is no
private, either normatively or empirically. Feminism confronts the fact that women have no
privacy to lose or to guarantee.”).
43
Pateman, supra note 13, at 295; see also Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the
Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1992) (“While there are particular
contexts in which a feminist agenda can be identified as advocating a change in the
public/private mix, it is hard to specify even one context or dimension of the distinction in
which the claim is that the whole category of the private is useless, or that private structuring
should be discontinued. The normative debates concern relationships between private and
public, but their conclusions do not assert that the differences should be obliterated or even
greatly reduced.”).
44
MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 83; see also ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED
WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 35–36 (2000).
45
MACKINNON, supra note 26, at 84–85.
46
Id. at 84.
47
Id. at 84–87.
48
Id. at 94–95.
49
Id.
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personal shortcomings, but rather it seems to have a connection to the
political status of men and women in general. This realization may then
empower women in similar situations to act toward changing the political
structures that allow violence to occur in their private homes.
Thus, consciousness-raising groups inspired the creation of shelters for
domestic violence victims during the early battered women’s movement. 50
These shelters were run by survivors of domestic abuse, and the women
who lived there were not viewed as “clients,” but rather as active
participants in the day-to-day organization of the shelter. 51 In other words,
these shelters were based on a grassroots, bottom-up approach where
everyone, including the residents, had a voice in the goals and direction of
the shelter. 52 Furthermore, early shelters respected women’s choices and
their decision to either leave or stay in a relationship.53
Indeed, this bottom-up approach was a common thread among various
feminist organizations throughout the United States during the late 1960s
and 1970s. 54 The women’s liberation movement was made up of
decentralized, grassroots organizations, and many organizations were
focused on just a single issue. 55 In addition, some women organized based
on particular theoretical groupings such as radical feminists, social
feminists, cultural feminists, and Marxist feminists. 56 Some women also
organized by race and created sub-groupings within that race such as black
radical feminists, black social feminists, and black cultural feminists.57
Formal procedural structures like Roberts’ Rules of Order were rejected as
part of the private/public distinction and a more personal, familial form of
conversing was adopted during meetings. 58
To these participants of the women’s liberation movement, therefore,
making the personal political meant looking at the personal experiences of
50

G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 258 (2005).
51
Id. at 259.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 286, 302.
54
ROSALYN BAXANDALL & LINDA GORDON, DEAR SISTERS: DISPATCHES FROM THE
WOMEN’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT 13–14 (2000).
55
Id. at 14.
56
Id. at 13.
57
Id. at 13–14.
58
Id. at 14–15. It should be noted that while this grassroots, decentralized approach was
a hallmark of the women’s liberation movement in the 1970s, not all feminists favored this
type of approach. Allowing everyone to have a voice inevitably limits the number of goals
that can be accomplished. As a result, liberal feminists who were part of the National
Organization for Women (NOW) actually adopted a more formalized and centralized
approach to addressing issues. Id. at 14.
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real women in order to learn about the systematic ways that they were
subordinated and abused in society. 59 Moreover, making the personal
political meant creating community among women and removing any
sources of isolation. It was this sense of community that created the source
of empowerment for political action. But an important aspect of this
political action was the fact that every woman was to have a voice in how to
politicize her personal life.
While feminists involved in the early battered women’s movement at
first focused on providing resources to women and on creating programs to
address the social and economic realities that keep women in abusive
relationships, 60 they also saw a role for the criminal justice system in
addressing this issue. They noted in particular the lack of enforcement of
laws against men who committed crimes against women. 61 Activists saw
this under-enforcement as “a symptom of patriarchal values and a tool for
maintaining gender dominance, in which the state was complicit for its
failure to intervene.” 62 For this reason, the early battered women’s
movement focused on addressing systematic inequality and patriarchal
social attitudes. 63
Activists spearheaded class action suits against cities and police
officers that failed to intervene and protect battered women. 64 In addition,
they began training prosecutors and police officers to treat domestic
violence victims with respect.65 “Such early reforms did not mandate that
victim’s wishes necessarily coincide with state prosecutorial aims. Rather,
they sought to give victims the option to access the legal system or external
services if they so desired.” 66 Thus, this particular feminist vision of
making the personal political is not necessarily inconsistent with a vision of
complete victim autonomy because participants in the early battered
women’s movement envisioned a criminal justice system where victims
could choose whether or not to engage with it. Those feminists who argue
for more victim autonomy today, therefore, seem to be more in line with
this earlier vision of the battered women’s movement. This view, however,
is not fully translatable within the current criminal justice political system.
59

SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 35.
Gruber, supra note 1, at 748–49.
61
Id. at 752.
62
Id. at 754.
63
Id. at 755.
64
Id. at 756; Siegel, supra note 9, at 2171; Linda G. Mills, Commentary, Killing Her
Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 558–
59 (1999).
65
Gruber, supra note 1, at 756.
66
Id. at 757.
60
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B. A LOSS IN TRANSLATION

It is true that the idea of the state intervening in private interactions is
not alien to the criminal justice system. 67 Crimes such as theft, homicide,
and assault all are examples of actions committed by private actors that are
subject to state censure. Yet, while participants of the early battered
women’s movement saw women or domestic violence victims as being the
central focus of the politicization of personal interactions, the central focus
of the American criminal justice is not just the victim. When an individual
violates a criminal law, he is considered to have committed a “‘social
harm,’ in that the injury suffered involves ‘a breach and violation of the
public rights and duties, due to the whole community, considered as a
community, in its social aggregate capacity.’” 68 Thus, while the prosecutor
certainly should consider the victim’s interests and desires when
prosecuting a case, he technically represents the state, which means that he
ultimately must act in the interest of the entire community. 69 For this
reason, while a victim can influence the disposition of a criminal case, she
does not have the authority to dismiss charges on her own. 70 In addition,
judges generally may dismiss a case without consulting the victim. 71
What is in the best interest of the entire community is what lawmakers
and their respective constituents say is best at particular time. By the late
1960s, a societal shift occurred where a retributivist view of the criminal
justice system became more dominant in mainstream American culture. 72
The reasons cited for this shift are varied, including an increase in the crime

67

See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938–
42 (1985) (discussing how, historically, there has been an evolution in criminal law away
from the “private” sphere toward a “public” one).
68
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 1 (4th ed. 2006) (quoting 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1769)).
69
Id.; see also Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic
Overview, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 19, 21 (1999) (noting that the community includes both
the victim and the defendant).
70
Dubber, supra note 69, at 21.
71
Id.
72
See Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive
Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1423 (2002). In contrast, during the first half of
the twentieth century political sensibilities viewed the criminal justice system as being a
vehicle for rehabilitation and reform. Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The
Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM.L.
REV. 1313, 1318–20 (2000). During this time, liberal theories of crime, which focused on
curing the causes of crime, such as “poverty, alienation, lack of education, and
discrimination” were influential. Henderson, supra note 67, at 943. There was also a focus
on protecting the constitutional rights of defendants, which was evident by the Warren
Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence at the time. Id.

2010]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

1267

rate, 73 a concern that discretionary rehabilitative policies were adversely
impacting poor African Americans and other cultural minorities,74 and a
loss of confidence in rehabilitative programs. 75 Because of these events, the
political will of the people drove lawmakers to draft criminal justice
policies with more of a retributivist focus.76 It cannot be denied, however,
that politicians also probably affected the will of the people in this regard. 77
Taking advantage of the rising crime rates, politicians saw an appealing
campaign issue and instituted a “war on crime,” which seized on the fear of
their constituents by pushing a message that the best way to combat crime is
to institute severe and harsh punishments on “bad criminals.”78 Richard
Nixon asserted:
I was in Philadelphia the other day. I found that a cab driver who had been cruelly
murdered and robbed, and the man who murdered and robbed him had confessed the
crime, was set free because of a Supreme Court decision. An old woman, who had
been brutally robbed and then murdered—the man who confessed the crime was set
free because of a Supreme Court decision . . . . My friends, when that’s happening in

73

Henderson, supra note 67, at 945 (noting also that photographs and news reports of
“riots, burning cities, and vicious and barbaric crimes” fed Americans’ fear of crime and
their particular fear of interracial crime).
74
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 56 (2001) (“The striking thing about this first major assault upon
the penal-welfarism is the extent to which it was launched from within the framework of
welfarist, social democracy . . . it continued to view crime as a product of social and
economic deprivation, and it looked to the state to provide the social reforms and welfare
support needed to address this social problem.”); see also Brown, supra note 72, at 1425
(stating that liberal scholars began advocating “just desert” theory of punishment “as a
means to reduce excessive and inequitable sentencing rather than as a rationale to justify
more consistently harsh incarceration, as it was used a few years later”).
75
GARLAND, supra note 74, at 61–63; Michael Tonry, Theories and Policies Underlying
Guidelines Systems: Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2005).
76
Dubber, supra note 69, at 5–6. The importance of public opinion in criminal policy is
a somewhat recent phenomenon. “A few decades ago public opinion functioned as an
occasional brake on policy initiatives: now it operates as a privileged source. The
importance of research and criminological knowledge is downgraded and in its place is a
new deference to the voice of ‘experience’, of ‘common sense’, of ‘what everyone knows’.”
GARLAND, supra note 74, at 13.
77
KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBATZ, CRIME IN THE PUBLIC MIND 5–6 (1995).
78
Henderson, supra note 67, at 945–47 (noting that the focus of conservatives was on the
responsibility of the individual rather than on the causes of crime); see also Dianne L.
Martin, Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform
Strategies, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151, 180 (1998) (arguing that the “crime card” has always
had particular appeal to politicians because it can serve as a distraction from less popular
initiatives); Tonry, supra note 75, at 1247–48 (noting that calls for increased toughness on
crime were a part of every presidential campaign from Barry Goldwater in 1964 “until Bill
Clinton nullified its emotive force by refusing to let Republicans get to his right on law and
order”).
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thousands of cases all over America, I say this. Some of our courts have gone too far
in their decisions weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in the
United States of America. And we’re going to change that. 79

Thus, the political will of society and the political messages of politicians
mutually influence each other.80
It was within this context of the general conservatization 81 of criminal
justice policy and the rise of the so-called victims' rights movement 82 in the
1980s that current mandatory domestic violence law policies were drafted.83
Under mandatory arrest policies, the police are strongly encouraged or
required to make an arrest if there is probable cause to believe there has
been a misdemeanor domestic violence violation.84 All fifty states now
allow warrantless arrests in cases where there is probable cause of a
misdemeanor domestic violence offense, 85 and most states have enacted
preferential or mandatory arrest statutes.86

79

LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 248 (1983) (quoting language from
a campaign speech that Nixon made in Ohio two weeks before the 1968 presidential
election).
80
GAUBATZ, supra note 77, at 5–6 (suggesting that the harsh public opinion about crime
probably was a precursor to the political “tough on crime” rhetoric, but that politicians
certainly escalated the public views on this subject through their political messages).
81
It should be noted that while this retributive focus on crime is generally viewed as a
conservative approach, many so-called liberal Democrats also have embraced the “tough on
crime” rhetoric as part of their political platforms. See GARLAND, supra note 74, at 13–14;
see also Tonry, supra note 75, at 1247–48.
82
Aya Gruber notes that the “victims’ rights” movement is not about victim agency.
[W]hile the movement engages the rhetoric of individual rights and victim autonomy, it is really
not about victim agency. Rather than securing victim autonomy without qualification, many
victims’ rights reforms simply seek to position the victim in the legal system in a way that
inexorably leads to more liability and punishment for the defendant. In a sense, the victim is a
foil, a tool of an even larger and more dangerous program of vigorous individuality and denial of
social responsibility. The victims’ rights movement is and always has been a product of
conservative tough-on-crime ideology.

Gruber, supra note 1, at 749–50; see also Henderson, supra note 67, at 948–49 (noting that
the victims’ rights movement was in part in response to the Warren’s Court’s jurisprudence
which strengthened the constitutional rights of the accused: “The ‘discovery’ of the crime
victim provided an individual to substitute for the state on the side of the scales opposite the
accused, thus making it appear that the balance was more ‘equal.’”).
83
Gruber, supra note 1, at 792–800; see also Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal Is
Political—and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387, 396 (2007)
(discussing how the “feminist agenda that demanded legal parity for domestic violence with
other crimes found a receptive environment in the law-and-order agenda of the 1970s and
1980s”).
84
Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic
Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1669–70 (2004).
85
Hanna, supra note 10, at 1859. Prior to 1984, most police officers could not arrest a
suspect without a warrant unless the misdemeanor was committed in the officer’s presence.
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In addition, many jurisdictions became more aggressive in prosecuting
domestic violence cases by instituting no-drop policies, which require or
encourage prosecutors to prosecute domestic violence cases regardless of
the victim’s wishes. 87 Sometimes hard no-drop jurisdictions will sanction
or arrest victims who refuse to voluntarily participate in the prosecution.88
Most jurisdictions with no-drop policies, however, do not force victims to
participate in the prosecution. 89 Instead, when possible, prosecutors use the
out-of-court statements of victims made in police statements or during 911
calls in lieu of their live testimony in what are called “victimless” or
“evidence-based” prosecutions. 90
Aya Gruber has documented how proponents of the “war on crime”
used Nicole Brown Simpson and the image of the vulnerable Caucasian,
upper-class domestic violence victim as the poster woman for their general
criminal justice policy of tough prosecution and harsh sentences. 91 Indeed,
mandatory arrest legislation had languished for years in several
jurisdictions, and it was not until Simpson’s death that there was a political
push for “zero tolerance” with respect to domestic violence. 92 Politicians
focus on high arrest and prosecution numbers in order to convince their
constituents that they are doing something tangible to curtail crime, even
when these actions may not actually be keeping individuals safe.93 Public

Officers could arrest a suspect without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that a
felony had been committed. Id.
86
Hanna, supra note 10, at 1859–60.
87
Mills, supra note 64, at 561.
88
Hanna, supra note 10, at 1863.
89
Id.
90
Kimberly D. Bailey, The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: Deconstructing the Sound
of Silence, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1, 2 (2009). The use of out-of-court statements at trial have
been limited by the Supreme Court decisions Crawford v. Washington and Davis v.
Washington. See id. at 2–3.
91
Gruber, supra note 1, at 793; see also Martin, supra note 78, at 157–58 (noting that the
victims’ rights movement only cares about “innocent” and “good” victims and that the
“unworthy, such as ‘bad’ mothers, ‘bad’ girls, and unruly youth, are never real victims, on
the other hand”); Henderson, supra note 67, at 951 (noting that with respect to the victims’
rights movement, “‘[v]ictims’ are not prostitutes beaten senseless by pimps or ‘johns’”). It is
also worth noting that the fact that Nicole Brown Simpsons’ ex-husband, O.J. Simpson, was
African-American probably also heightened her victimhood given the stereotypes of angry
black men and vulnerable white women.
92
Gruber, supra note 1, at 793 n.222.
93
Martin, supra note 78, at 160 (arguing that when citizens express anger and
disappointment with the inability of the criminal legal system to keep them safe, politicians
move away from addressing the complex problem of actual security and toward the symbolic
and easier task of recognizing the wrong committed); see also Dubber, supra note 69, at 18–
20 (noting that prosecutors’ and judges’ decisions are affected by the electorate).
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oversight is particularly palpable with respect to domestic violence cases
after the publicity following Simpson’s murder:
In the oral culture of a prosecutor’s office, a misdemeanor [domestic violence]
defendant has the potential to be an O.J. Simpson. In other words, every case is to be
treated as a potential prelude to murder. Rookie prosecutors are warned that their DV
misdemeanors are the cases that could get their names in the newspaper for failure to
prevent something more serious. Thus in DV cases, prosecutors make decisions in the
shadow of public oversight and have an enhanced incentive to use every means
available to protect victims. 94

It is important to note that during the early stages of the battered
women’s movement in the 1970s and 1980s, many feminists were quite
wary of aligning their interests with the state, which represented to them the
patriarchal domination that they were seeking to overcome. 95 But the
reality was that legal actors did not treat domestic violence victims the same
as victims of other crimes covered by discretionary arrest and prosecution
policies. 96 G. Kristian Miccio, an advocate instrumental in drafting the
mandatory arrest policy in New York, has poignantly discussed the
ambivalence she and other advocates felt about engaging with the state in
dealing with domestic violence. 97 Yet, because women’s cries for help
were routinely being ignored under discretionary policies, she recalls that
she felt that feminists had “no other alternative” but to support mandatory
policies. 98 Proponents believed that these policies would enable victims to
reclaim their bodies from their batterers and that these policies were
essential for women’s safety and bodily integrity. 99
First, feminists who supported these policies believed that making
arrests and prosecutions mandatory for domestic violence cases would
ensure formal gender equality because the percentage of domestic violence
cases prosecuted would equal the number of cases prosecuted with respect
to other crimes. 100 In addition, feminists and advocates for domestic
violence victims hoped that these policies would deter future violence and
that they would empower women to remain abuse free.101 Finally,
proponents of mandatory policies felt that these policies had an important

94

Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 44–45 (2006).
Gruber, supra note 1, at 758.
96
Id. at 757.
97
Miccio, supra note 50, at 274–82.
98
Id. at 279.
99
Id.
100
Gruber, supra note 1, at 758.
101
Id. at 759–60.
95
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symbolic value in that it meant that state actors were taking the issue of
domestic violence seriously. 102
There are some who still argue that mandatory policies are an
important component of domestic violence law and policy. In addition to
the reasons detailed above, they argue that mandatory policies prevent
batterers from intimidating their partners into not proceeding with charges
against them. 103 They also argue that lax prosecution policies will decrease
police officers’ confidence in the value of arrest and will undermine their
diligence in policing domestic violence. 104 Furthermore, some have argued
that even if prosecution and incarceration do not rehabilitate batterers, it is
better to put batterers in jail than to force victims into shelters.105 Finally,
they argue that domestic violence offenders are a threat to all members of
society, not just to their intimate partners.106 Some research suggests that
violent offenders in a family are more likely to assault nonfamily
members. 107 Some scholars also note that batterers will continue to be
abusive to future partners and that mandatory policies protect children from
violence. 108
Yet, mandatory policies have had staying power not because they have
actually protected women in the ways that their proponents originally
hoped, but because they are written in a language that makes sense in a
retributivist and prosecutorially-focused criminal justice system.
If
batterers are going to be considered criminals, then they need to be arrested
and prosecuted. There is no room for victim ambivalence or hesitancy, and
victim autonomy simply does not make sense in this context. For all of
these reasons, complete victim autonomy got lost in the translation of the
early battered women’s movement’s vision of domestic violence policy into
concrete criminal justice policies.

102

Id. at 759.
Hanna, supra note 10, at 1892; Sack, supra note 84, at 1673, 1690.
104
Hanna, supra note 10, at 1893; see also Sack, supra note 84, at 1673.
105
Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 180 (1997).
106
Hanna, supra note 10, at 1889.
107
Id. at 1889.
108
Id. at 1895–96.
103
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III. THE NUMBER OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS WHO ENGAGE WITH
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS AN IMPORTANT METRIC IN
DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
POLICY
A. WHY THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS AN IMPORTANT
COMPONENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY

Some may argue that the criminal justice system should not play any
role at all within domestic violence law and policy given its impact on
victim autonomy. The problem is, however, that it cannot be denied that
many domestic violence victims do call the police to their aid during and
after acts of violence. In addition, many victims want their batterers
prosecuted. In fact, sixty-five percent of the African-American women who
participated in a study by Arlene N. Weisz supported the prosecution of
their batterer.109 Furthermore, many victims probably need the resources of
the criminal justice system in order to be adequately protected from the
violence in their lives. Thus, the criminal justice system does play an
important role for some domestic violence victims, and we do not want to
go back to a system that is nonresponsive to their needs.
Another potential response to the inevitable tension between complete
victim autonomy and the goals of the criminal justice system could be that a
new, victim-centered model for criminal justice should be created. Under
this model, the desires and wishes of the victim would determine the role of
the criminal justice system in a particular circumstance. For example, one
potential model could be that instead of focusing on arrest and prosecution
of the batterer, the focus would be on keeping the victim safe during a
particular moment. In some circumstances, that might mean arresting the
batterer and detaining him for a few hours until the immediate danger has
passed. In other circumstances, the victim may determine that the threat
from the call to the police was all that was needed to diffuse the situation
and that arrest is not even necessary. If the victim ultimately decides to
drop charges or to not prosecute her batterer, she would not be vilified by
the system under the victim-centered approach. Instead, each moment that
the police keep a victim safe would be considered the victory, not the
successful prosecution and the jail sentence.
One potential problem with this model is that there is a danger that the
police would becomes less responsive to victims if they are asked to make
repeated calls to the same house with no hope of an ultimate prosecution.
109

HILLARY POTTER, BATTLE CRIES: BLACK WOMEN AND INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE 84
(2008). Hoan N. Bui found that African-American women were more likely to want to
prosecute their partners than Caucasian women. Id.
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Indeed, one of the reasons for instituting no-drop prosecution policies was
because it was believed that police officers would be more motivated to
answer domestic violence calls if they believed that the batterer would
actually be prosecuted; otherwise, police officers would find their actions to
be futile. 110 This prosecutorial focus of the police should not be surprising
given the current language of the criminal justice system. There is also still
evidence that some police officers are not responsive even under mandatory
policies since they still exercise discretion in determining whether there is
probable cause of a domestic violence violation.111
Perhaps policies could be instituted to make sure that police officers
remain responsive. For example, police officers could be required to
complete paperwork verifying that they answered domestic violence calls.
Follow-up interviews could also be conducted with victims who made calls
to the police. When there is a pattern of officers ignoring domestic violence
calls in a particular locale, class action suits could be filed on equal
protection grounds just as was done in the early part of the battered
women’s movement. Realistically, however, this type of follow-up
probably would be difficult for many jurisdictions to maintain due to
limited resources. There is a potential danger, therefore, that a victimcentered approach could end up going back to a system where criminal
legal actors do not take domestic violence seriously. 112
The other potential problem with the victim-centered approach is that
there may be occasions where we do not want the victim’s desires to trump
the interests of the state. For example, a domestic violence victim may
have a legitimate need for her batterer to stay out of jail because he is the
main economic provider for her household. If her batterer, however, has a
history where he has committed serious violence not only against his
domestic partner, but also against members of society at large, it may be in
the state’s interest to incapacitate him in order to prevent him from being a
danger not only to the victim, but also to those who are not in an intimate
relationship with him. Moreover, there is research that suggests that
prolonged incarceration may be the only way to protect victims from
chronic, repeat offenders. 113 In those situations where the offender has
exhibited seriously violent behavior, therefore, the state’s interest in
110

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
Sack, supra note 84, at 1690, 1696. Prosecutors also have discretion under no-drop
policies; they just do not have the discretion to drop a case merely because a victim does not
want to go forward. Id. at 1696.
112
Id. at 1688–90 (expressing skepticism that police and prosecutors would be
responsive to domestic violence victims without mandatory policies).
113
Eve. S. Buzawa & Aaron D. Buzawa, Courting Domestic Violence Victims: A Tale of
Two Cities, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 671, 681–82 (2008).
111
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protecting both the victim and society at large should trump the victim’s
desires with respect to the criminal justice system, and we should deal with
her economic interests through other means. Finally, the state also has an
interest in protecting children who experience violence in the home. 114
For all of these reasons, the criminal justice system is an important
component of domestic violence policy, and I acknowledge that the wishes
of the victim should not always be the priority of the criminal justice
system. As I discuss below, however, acknowledging that victim autonomy
should not always be the priority of the criminal justice system does not
mean that there is no reason to be concerned about the fact that so many
domestic violence victims currently choose not to engage with the system.
B. WHY THE LACK OF ENGAGEMENT OF MANY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
VICTIMS IS A CAUSE FOR CONCERN

Although the complete autonomy of every domestic violence victim is
not the main priority of the criminal justice system, the fact that so many
victims do not want to engage with this system should still be troubling
because it suggests that this system is not as effective in addressing the
issue of domestic violence as one might hope. One would think that more
victims would take advantage of this resource if it were truly helpful to
them. Instead, it has been estimated that as many as sixty to eighty percent
of domestic violence victims ultimately either recant their testimony or
refuse to testify altogether against their batterers. 115
Some might dismiss these alarming statistics because they believe that
domestic violence victims are psychologically damaged individuals who
cannot make logical decisions for themselves. 116 For this reason, these
victims need the state to make decisions for them. The reality is, however,
that the profiles of domestic violence victims are much more complex than
some might presume. The literature on these victims suggests that many of
114
Jennifer Collins, Criminal Law Comes Home to a Family, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 699 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009). But for a discussion regarding the
complications that arise for battered women who are mothers, including being more
vulnerable to findings of child neglect and losing custody of their children, see SCHNEIDER,
supra note 44, at 148–78.
115
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 6, at 87; Lininger, supra note 6, at 751.
116
The sensationalism surrounding homicide cases involving battered women who killed
their husbands and the introduction of expert testimony on battered women has contributed
to this stereotype. See Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1223, 1243–44 (2001); Martha R. Mahoney, supra note 7, at 36–43. Feminists
advocated for the use of this type of expert testimony for the purpose of explaining the
complexity of these women’s lives; the law and popular culture, however, have distorted
battered women’s syndrome into a dysfunctional caricature of these women’s lives. Id.; see
also SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 124–25.
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them are quite rational individuals who are making the best choices they
can under constrained circumstances.117
Others might presume that most victims do not engage with the
criminal justice system because they are afraid of their batterers. As a
result, they may fear that giving voice to victims’ desires to not prosecute a
case essentially allows batterers to control the process. While fear is
sometimes a reason that victims hesitate to engage with the criminal justice
system, there are many other complex and legitimate reasons why they
choose not to engage. 118 Thus, if domestic violence victims are rational and
have legitimate reasons for not engaging with the criminal justice system,
we should not be ignoring this lack of engagement. Instead, we should be
paying attention to their reasons for not engaging with the system in order
to determine whether current criminal justice policies are harming them and
whether there are improvements that can be made within the criminal
justice system that can help them. For example, if it is the case that arrest
and prosecution may put some domestic violence victims in more danger, 119
completely ignoring the victim’s wishes is a serious problem because many
victims may be able to gauge quite accurately whether criminal justice
intervention is in their best interest on a particular occasion.120 It is
particularly troubling that the women who seem to be the most
detrimentally affected by mandatory policies are the same women who have
the least amount of political power, specifically, poor women, women of
color, and immigrants. 121 Mandatory policies, therefore, seem to be a
continuation of the voicelessness and subordination that these women
already experience within the political system.
Furthermore, it is believed that domestic violence is underreported. 122
It seems that many women do not report their abuse to the authorities at all.
If most resources are directed toward a criminal justice solution to domestic
violence, this means that there are a lot of women who are not getting any
help at all. Donna Coker has documented the ways that mandatory policies
have made battered women more vulnerable to state control, which can

117

See SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 123–24; Chiu, supra note 116, at 1259–60.
These include fear of the batterer, an emotional attachment to the batterer and a desire
to make the marriage work, and a lack of material resources, safety, and positive interactions
with the criminal justice system. Chiu, supra note 116, at 1253; Coker, supra note 1, at
1048–49.
119
See supra Part III.
120
See also Coker, supra note 1, at 826–27; Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of
Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV.
1133, 1159–60 (1994).
121
See infra Part III.
122
DUTTON, supra note 7, at 218; Mahoney, supra note 7, at 11.
118
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ultimately lead to harmful consequences for these women. 123 If domestic
violence victims are not seeking assistance from the state in order to avoid
these consequences, mandatory policies may be alienating and isolating
domestic violence victims instead creating the empowerment and sense of
community that feminists originally envisioned with respect to political
solutions to private violence.
I acknowledge that the concept of autonomy, 124 or the ability to have
decisionmaking authority in one’s life, is a particularly complicated concept
in the domestic violence context. For example, if a woman chooses not to
prosecute her batterer because he is the main economic provider in the
family, some might argue that she is not making a “true” choice in the sense
that she is surely not “choosing” to continue to live in violence, but rather
she is choosing what she views as the lesser of two evils. I do not deny the
constraints in victims’ lives that limit their choices. Yet, it is important to
consider whether victims, rather than the state, may sometimes be in the
best position to make the best choice under those constrained
circumstances. 125 Acknowledging these constraints, however, should not
lessen the burden on society to create ways to limit the extent that those
constraints are based on gender, class, and racial subordination so that
women can make more meaningful choices.126
C. WHAT THE LACK OF ENGAGEMENT TELLS US

In order to examine the lack of victim engagement further, one of the
key insights from the women’s and early battered women’s movements can
prove quite helpful: a grassroots approach that focuses on the perspectives
of individual women can be beneficial in creating effective political
solutions. Applying this bottom-up approach, we should focus on why it is
that so many victims refuse to engage with this system. Evidence thus far
shows that there are two important reasons why many victims do not
engage. First, there is a need for improvement in the criminal justice
treatment of domestic violence. Second, the current focus on the criminal

123

See infra notes 212–214 and accompanying text.
For a discussion on feminist debates regarding how to define autonomy and what role
the government should play in fostering autonomy, see Linda C. McClain, Toleration,
Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond ‘Empty’ Toleration to
Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 124–29 (1998); Miccio, supra note 50, at 310–16.
125
But see Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 426
(1985) (arguing that individuals do not always make choices in order to increase their own
well-being, but rather in order to submit to authority).
126
See infra Part III.C.2.
124
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justice system as the main solution to this problem is of limited
effectiveness given the social, political, and economic aspects of this issue.
1. Ways the Criminal Justice System Needs to Improve
a. Poor Interactions with Legal Actors
By listening to the personal experiences of domestic violence victims,
one discovers that the quality of victims’ interactions with actors in the
criminal justice system affects their willingness to participate in the
prosecution of their batterers. 127 One survey found that women were more
afraid of the courts and the law than they were of harming their relationship
with their partner or of retaliation from their partner.128 The women’s two
greatest concerns were that the prosecutors would not prepare them for trial
and that the defendant would not be found guilty. 129 Eve and Carl Buzawa
also have documented how ill-informed domestic violence victims are
about the prosecution process, which can lead to high rates of victim
attrition. 130
In addition to a lack of communication and information, some actors in
the criminal justice system sometimes exhibit a negative response to
battered women. Prosecutors are baffled when victims refuse to leave
abusive partners or to help with the prosecution of their batterers.131 This
lack of understanding can leave some prosecutors feeling frustrated,
indifferent, or cynical.132 Likewise, victims feel frustrated that prosecutors
are so out of touch with the everyday realities of their lives. Hillary Potter
interviewed a woman who expressed her frustrations this way:
I felt like I was a walking statistic. I was this number out of the sociology books, I
felt like, “You really can’t relate, leave me alone.” My victim advocate, I forget her
name, she would ask me questions, go on and on. I was like, “Lady, leave me alone.
I’m dealing with trying to pay my rent.” . . . I felt like, “Leave me alone, I’ve got
enough going on. You’re not helping me. What can you do to help me? Unless

127

Coker, supra note 1, at 840; see also Mills, supra note 64, at 595 (citing studies that
suggest that when a battered woman has a negative interaction with the state, she is less
likely to rely on state assistance in the future).
128
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH:
SUMMARIES FOR JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS 13 (Barbara E. Smith ed., 2003), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/202564.pdf (summarizing JOANNE BELKNAP ET AL.,
FACTORS RELATED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT DISPOSITIONS IN A LARGE URBAN AREA
(2000)).
129
Id.
130
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 6, at 95.
131
Id.
132
Id.
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you’re going to write me a check, you can’t help me . . . .” I was dealing with my
own emotions and I still had to get up and cook and do all the things I had to do. 133

Prosecutors also may erect barriers that “test” the commitment of
victims to prosecute. 134 This attitude then leads more victims to drop
charges or to not appear in court, which reinforces the beliefs of
prosecutors, police, and other staff that becoming involved in domestic
violence cases is futile. 135 Thus, the vicious cycle between the lack of
cooperation of victims and the negative attitudes among legal actors that
result from this lack of cooperation continues.
Domestic violence victims also have reported that legal and court
personnel are sometimes demeaning and patronizing. 136 One study found
that court clerks, who were supposed to help women file protective orders,
provided little assistance to women with special needs such as literacy
barriers and language translation. 137 In addition, some clerks actively
discouraged women from filing protective orders. 138 Furthermore, there
have been cases where judges condescendingly trivialized the fears of
domestic violence victims and ignored their requests for protection,
ultimately placing these victims in grave danger.139
Poor interactions with the police, who are the first line of defense for
many domestic violence victims, are particularly troubling. As has already
been discussed, police still have quite a bit of discretion even under
mandatory policies because they must determine whether there is probable
cause for arrest. Unfortunately, when dealing with the police, victims have
found some skeptical of their reports of abuse and suspicious that they are
acting in retaliation in order to get something out of the batterer, such as
child support. 140 There have also been situations where officers have talked
133

POTTER, supra note 109, at 142.
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 6, at 189.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An
Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 172
(1993).
138
Id.
139
JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSES 4–5 (1999) (describing the case of Pamela Dunn who was shot, stabbed, and
strangled by her husband five months after a judge chastised her for requesting a police
escort to her apartment to gather her belongings); Bailey, supra note 90, at 45–46 (describing
the case of Evette Cade whose estranged husband doused her with gasoline and set her on
fire after a judge ignored Cade’s request to leave a protective order him in place).
140
POTTER, supra note 109, at 177. One of the women that Hillary Potter interviewed
recounted one specific incident as follows:
134

At one point I actually did call the police. . . . They came to my house and I thought, “OK, good,
I’m going to take care of this.” They told me, “You’re just doing this because you’re mad at

2010]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

1279

to women in the presence of their batterers, limiting the victims’
willingness to talk frankly about the abuse. 141
The poor interactions between victims and the police may be partially
explained by the fact that it is has been documented that a significant
number of police officers may themselves be batterers. The Neidig Study
documented that approximately twenty-eight percent of police officers selfreported that they had committed an act of physical aggression against their
spouse in the previous year. 142 In an unpublished study conducted by Lanor
Johnson, forty percent of officers “surveyed reported that they had behaved
violently toward their spouse and/or children in the last six months.”143 If a
substantial number of police officers are engaging in domestic violence, it
cannot be expected that they will adequately protect victims from the same
type of behavior. Furthermore, as victims sense that the police are not
taking the violence in their homes seriously, they will be less willing to
engage with the criminal justice system or less likely to expect that the
criminal justice system will ever help them. Finally, victims of abusive
police officers often feel that they cannot seek out help from the same
criminal justice that employs their intimate partners. There has been a great
deal of media attention surrounding the case of Drew Peterson, the former
police officer who is suspected of being involved in the disappearance of
his wife, Stacy Peterson. 144 One of the most disturbing allegations related
to this case is that Stacy was a domestic violence victim who felt that she
had nowhere to turn because her husband was a police officer.145
b. Lack of Adequate Protection
An attempt to separate from one’s batterer can be very dangerous. 146
According to Martha Mahoney, “[a]t least half of women who leave their
abusers are followed and harassed or further attacked by them. In one study

him. Are you doing this because you want child support?” I was so hurt. They was going
through my drawers and my kitchen and asking me if I was on welfare. They weren’t even
asking me what happened. They were like drilling me. So after that I killed it. My whole mind
and my body and my spirit, I killed it, and I never talked about it again, until one day I finally
told my mother.

Id.
141

Id. at 178.
Peter H. Neidig, Harold E. Russell, & Albert F. Seng, Interspousal Aggression in Law
Enforcement Families: A Preliminary Investigation, 15 POLICE STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE
DEV. 30, 32 (1992).
143
Id. at 31.
144
See The Real Story Here, CHI. DAILY HERALD, May 19, 2009, at A1.
145
See Erika Slife, When Cop Causes Family Violence; Many Victims May Have
Nowhere to Turn, Experts Say, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 2008, at W1.
146
Mahoney, supra note 116, at 80.
142
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of interspousal homicide, more than half of the men who killed their
spouses did so when the partners were separated.” 147 Some argue that
women are safest when they willingly partner with state actors to
investigate and prosecute domestic violence cases. 148 The truth is, however,
that the criminal justice system often fails to protect these women even
when they are willing participants. As has already been discussed, even
after the institution of mandatory policies, some victims still find the
criminal justice system nonresponsive to their cries for help.149 If a victim
has found the system to be nonresponsive in the past, she may determine
that it is not worth her time to contact the police on future occasions.150
Moreover, if a victim fears that her partner may retaliate once she contacts
the police, she certainly is not going to report the abuse if she believes that
she is not going to be protected from that retaliation. For these reasons,
domestic violence victims cannot be expected to engage with the criminal
justice system if they cannot rely on it for adequate protection.
2. Domestic Violence is a Social, Political, and Economic Issue
Feminists who advocated for a strong criminal justice response to
domestic violence also recognized that arrest alone was not going to curb
this problem; criminalization would be meaningless if victims did not also
have access to housing, jobs, and social support systems. 151 Furthermore,
these feminists were interested in deconstructing the political structures that
subordinate women and keep them vulnerable to violence.152 Thus, the
high lack of engagement of domestic violence victims highlights the fact
that while the criminal justice system is an important tool, it is an extremely
limited one. There are social, political, and economic aspects of domestic
violence that cannot be addressed within the criminal justice system itself.
These factors also constrain some victims’ ability or willingness to fully

147

Id. at 64–65.
Mills, supra note 64, at 551.
149
For examples of victims who found the criminal justice system nonresponsive, see
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2004); Bailey, supra note 90, at 45–46.
150
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 6, at 78 (“Perhaps the most insidious effect of past
poor police practices may be a contribution to the inordinately high rates of victims not
calling the police or victim screening.”); Sara R. Benson, Failure to Arrest: A Pilot Study of
Police Response to Domestic Violence in Rural Illinois, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y &
L. 685, 700 (2009) (suggesting that inadequate police responses in rural areas may be
discouraging victims from seeking further assistance).
151
See Miccio, supra note 50, at 263–67; see also Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing
and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 1030 (2004) (arguing that criminal law “is a critical component of
what must necessarily be a multi-faceted enterprise”).
152
See id.
148
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engage with and take advantage of the criminal justice system. Thus, while
activists and scholars should continue to advocate for improvements within
the criminal justice system, they should also view this system as a very
limited tool that should be part of a broader set of social, political, and
economic policies.
a. Limited Economic Resources
As already discussed, one of the important insights behind the mantra
“the personal is political” is that the public spheres and the private spheres
are interrelated. The fact that women have less economic power than men
in the public sphere necessarily correlates to their vulnerability to violence
in their personal lives.153 Women often do not want to testify in court, or
often recant and testify on behalf of their batterers in court, because of
limited economic resources. “Women’s decisions whether or not to support
criminal justice intervention are often related to whether or not they can
afford to prioritize prosecution over other more immediate concerns such as
food, employment, and childcare.” 154 For many women, the reality is that
the incarceration of their spouses means destitution and homelessness for
their families. 155 In addition, many women may not want to report
domestic violence to the authorities because they do not want to affect
future job prospects for either themselves or for their partners. 156
Furthermore, while the current criminal justice response is based on
the premise that the victim will separate from her batterer, the reality is that
many victims cannot afford separation. A domestic violence victim faces a
fifty percent chance that her standard of living will drop below the poverty
line when she chooses to leave her batterer.157 It also has been estimated
that nearly half of all homeless women and children have fled violence in

153

Donna Coker, Addressing Domestic Violence Through a Strategy of Economic Rights,
24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 187, 188 (2003); see also Sack, supra note 84, at 1734 (arguing
that the number one reason women stay with batterers is economic dependence and that the
most likely predictor of whether a battered woman will permanently separate from her
abuser is whether she has the economic resources to survive without him); Ola W. Barnett,
Why Battered Women Do Not Leave, Part 1: External Inhibiting Factors Within Society, 1
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 343, 347–49 (2000) (citing several studies that show a positive
association between a lack of independent income and a woman’s inability to leave an
abusive relationship).
154
Coker, supra note 1, at 823; see also Mahoney, supra note 7, at 62 (noting a lack of
resources for women who separate from their batterers).
155
Mahoney, supra note 7, at 62; see also Coker, supra note 1, at 188 (“Abusive men
cause women to lose jobs, educational opportunities, careers, homes, savings, their health,
their ability to enter the workplace.”).
156
Weissman, supra note 83, at 435.
157
Lininger, supra note 6, at 769.
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the home. 158 When women with children do take the economic risk to
escape abuse, they often find they are punished for their lack of resources
with findings of child neglect and further state scrutiny. 159 Thus, some of
the current policies in the criminal justice system may actually be putting
some women in more danger due to their economic circumstances.
The complexity of this economic issue, however, cannot be ignored.
Providing domestic violence victims with shelter, subsidies, and education
after suffering from abuse are certainly important, but these remedies are
not enough. A key goal of domestic violence law and policy must be to
address the institutionalized economic vulnerability of women in society.
In Justice, Gender, and the Family, Susan Okin gives an extensive
analysis of this vulnerability. She notes how women are socialized from an
early age to believe that marriage and family are very important.160 Part of
this socialization entails the expectation that the woman is to be the primary
caretaker in the family. 161 This expectation necessarily affects the choices
that young girls make regarding the extent and field of education they will
pursue and how purposeful they are about their careers; they are cognizant
of the effects of family life on their work and the effects of work on their
family life. 162 As a result, the occupational aspirations of adolescents tend
to be differentiated by sex, and this differentiation is similar to sex
segregation that is found in the workplace.163 Young girls are attracted to
careers that can accommodate a parent who is the primary caregiver; these
158

Barnett, supra note 153, at 348 (citing research suggesting that twenty-one to sixtyfour percent of clients in shelters are homeless); Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in
Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court
System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 8 (1999).
159
Mahoney, supra note 7, at 69–72.
160
OKIN, supra note 25, at 142.
161
Id.; see also JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1 (2000).
162
OKIN, supra note 25, at 142.
163
Id. at 142–43. In 2007, only nine percent of female professional workers worked in
the high-paying fields of computers and engineering. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT 1008, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2007, at 2 (2008)
[hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS]. In contrast, forty-three percent of
professional male workers worked in these fields. Id. Professional women are more likely
to work in the lower-paying fields of education and health care; sixty-seven percent of
female professionals worked in these fields in 2007, compared to only thirty percent of their
male counterparts. Id. According to the Current Population Survey, in 2005, women made
up only thirty-one percent of workers in the highest earnings category, while they made up a
slight majority of those in the lowest earnings category. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS, SUMMARY 06-03, WOMEN STILL
UNDERREPRESENTED AMONG HIGHEST EARNERS 1 (2006); see also WILLIAMS, supra note
161, at 66 (“Three-fourths of all working women still work in predominantly female
occupations.”).
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careers tend to provide salaries on the lower end of the pay scale.164 These
professions also tend to have less opportunity for mobility and
advancement. 165 In 2007, women who were full-time wage and salary
workers made about eighty percent of what their male counterparts made. 166
The differential increased by age group. Thus, women between the ages of
sixteen and twenty-four made ninety-two percent of what their male
counterparts earned, women between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four
made eighty-seven percent of what their male counterparts earned, and
women between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-four earned only seventythree percent of what their male counterparts earned. 167 These statistics
demonstrate that women do not advance in their careers, and therefore do
not increase their earnings, at the same rate as men. 168
Because many women enter marriage making lower salaries than their
spouses, the traditional family model where the wife handles a
disproportionate share of the work at home makes rational and economic
sense. 169 Since the husband is making more money, many families decide
to make his career the priority, and the wife takes on more duties at home
and becomes the primary caregiver to their children. 170 The wife’s lower
salary gives her less leverage in challenging the traditional division of labor
in the household and in demanding more equal sharing of child-rearing and
household chores. 171 As a result, many men can work late hours and accept
overtime assignments with the confidence of knowing that their wives are
taking care of any home and family obligations. 172 In contrast, the amount
164

OKIN, supra note 25, at 143.
Id. at 143–44.
166
HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 163, at 1.
167
Id. The differential decreases again for women sixty-five and older, who earned
seventy-eight percent of their male counterparts. Id. at 9 tbl.1.
168
See also infra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing how career disruption
during a woman’s childbearing years is another reason why women do not earn as much as
men during the lifespan of their careers); WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 66 (noting also that
limited access to “mentoring and social contacts” impede promotion to high-level
managerial and professional jobs).
169
See OKIN, supra note 25, at 146.
170
Id. Interestingly, as a class, African-American men spend longer hours on household
work than their Caucasian counterparts. Yoshinori Kamo & Ellen L. Cohen, Division of
Household Work Between Partners: A Comparison of Black and White Couples, 29 J. COMP.
FAM. STUD. 131, 141 (1998). Yet, overall, they still only perform 34.5% of the total
household work load in their homes. Id.
171
OKIN, supra note 25, at 148. Note, however, that as a class, women still perform a
disproportionate share of household work even when they make equivalent or higher salaries
than their husbands. Kamo & Cohen, supra note 170, at 141.
172
WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 71–72, 79–81 (noting that the most successful
executives tend to have wives who work full-time in the home and that the best factory jobs
require overtime).
165
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of time and energy needed to tend to their disproportionate share of work in
the home 173 provides many women with less time and energy for paid work
outside of the home. 174 Unfortunately, the distribution of power within the
home can be affected by the possession by each spouse of resources valued
outside of the home, specifically money and status. 175 The distribution of
duties between husbands and wives, therefore, reinforces the asymmetric
power relation between them. 176 In other words, the limited access that
many women have to the public sphere can decrease their economic and
political power within the marital relationship and make them more
vulnerable to subordination and violence.
In addition, discrimination in the workplace does not make it an
attractive place for many women to be. They are demeaned and sexually
harassed, and they are represented in token numbers in positions of
influence that could help shape workplace and political policies that would
make things more equal. 177 Employment discrimination issues are
compounded for women of color and immigrant women. 178 Not only does
discrimination in the workplace limit some women’s economic
independence, but this discrimination can also reinforce some women’s
“choice” to focus more on household duties and to support their husband’s
higher paying career.179 Due to these stressors both inside and outside of

173

On average, women handle seventy-five percent of household duties. SYLVIA ANN
HEWLETT, OFF-RAMPS AND ON-RAMPS: KEEPING TALENTED WOMEN ON THE ROAD TO
SUCCESS 36 (2007). In addition, there is a growing trend where women’s caretaking duties
include not only taking care of their children, but also taking care of their parents and
grandparents. Id. at 33–36. On average, African-American women spend more time on
elder and extended family care than Caucasian women. Id. at 36.
174
OKIN, supra note 25, at 154–55; see Gavison, supra note 43, at 14; see also
WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 79–80 (noting how women are particularly disadvantaged in
blue-collar jobs because taking time off to care for children affects their seniority and limits
their time for extra training, both of which are crucial for advancement); Weissman, supra
note 83, at 426 (noting that women that choose to focus more of their time on paid work
outside of the home “are often disparaged as bad mothers”).
175
OKIN, supra note 25, at 158; WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 57.
176
OKIN, supra note 25, at 156–59.
177
Id. at 132–33; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 66 (noting the prevalence of
sexual harassment in traditionally male blue-collar jobs).
178
SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 63; Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1241–49 (1991). In 2007, the median earnings for full-time wage and salary AfricanAmerican women workers was eighty-five percent of that earned by their Caucasian women
counterparts. HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 163, at 8 tbl.1.
179
OKIN, supra note 25, at 146–48; see also Gavison, supra note 43, at 17. Note that
African-American and Latina women make ninety percent of what their male counterparts
make, compared to Caucasian and Asian women who earned only eighty percent of what
their male counterparts earned. HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 163, at 1.
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the home, some women even decide to focus on working in the home fulltime. 180
Moreover, an increase in education level does not eliminate the issue
of economic dependence for many women. 181 Indeed, while the number of
women who have obtained graduate degrees and have aspired for more
prestigious careers has increased since Okin’s analysis,182 it has been
documented that there is a “brain drain” in these professions as many of
these women either leave these careers entirely in order to work full-time in
the home or they take a “scenic route”183 through their careers in order to
allow more time to handle household demands.184 Most careers are still
based on a model where the employee has a partner who is taking care of
most of the duties in the home. 185 Joan Williams describes this situation as
the “ideal-worker” norm. 186 Because many women still operate in a family
Yet, these women still on average perform a disproportionate share of unpaid work in the
home. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
180
See Weissman, supra note 83, at 426 (noting also that women sometimes leave their
jobs “because of their concerns that work outside of the home conflicts with the proper
fulfillment of the role of a good mother”). Of course, the ability to work full-time in the
home is related to socioeconomic status. For example, African-American women have
always been more likely to work outside of the home than their Caucasian counterparts,
beginning with slavery. Kamo & Cohen, supra note 170, at 131–32. In addition, shifts in
the economy caused by globalization have made work outside of the home necessary for
many women. Weissman, supra note 83, at 410.
181
See WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 67 (noting that the narrowing of the gap between
men and women in education level “has not led to proportional representation of women in
high-level white-collar jobs”).
182
See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003 at 44
(noting that in 2003, sixty-three percent of the graduating class at Berkeley Law School,
forty-six percent of the graduating class at Harvard Law School, and fifty-one percent of the
graduating class at Columbia Law School were women; similarly, forty-seven percent of all
medical students were women).
183
“They don’t step out entirely; rather, they step back a bit—taking a part-time job, a
flexible work arrangement, or a telecommuting option, or turning down a promotion,
deciding that they cannot take on additional responsibility.” HEWLETT, supra note 173, at
29–30.
184
Id. at 14, 43 (stating that thirty-seven percent of highly qualified women surveyed
[defined as women with a graduate or professional degree or a high-honors undergraduate
degree] voluntarily left their careers for a period of time, more than thirty percent took a
“scenic route” in their careers, and many women found it difficult to re-enter the workforce
on a full-time basis after taking time off); Belkin, supra note 182, (noting that ninety-five
percent of Caucasian men with M.B.A.’s are working full-time, compared with sixty-seven
percent of their Caucasian women counterparts; the numbers of African-American women
are closer to those of Caucasian men).
185
WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 1.
186
Id. Williams notes that the ideal-worker norm does not define all jobs, but it does
define the best jobs, including full-time blue-collar jobs and high-level professional jobs. Id.
In addition to working long hours, an ability to relocate is also important for advancement in
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structure where they handle a disproportionate share of the duties of the
home, however, managing a work–life balance has become difficult. 187
This reality is compounded by the experience of sex discrimination and
harassment in the workplace. Kathleen Gerson conducted a study where
she found that many women made the decision to work full-time in the
home at the same time that they became frustrated with the dead-end nature
of their jobs. 188 Similarly, women who originally viewed themselves as
being more “domestically oriented” found themselves more career oriented
when opportunities for work advancement opened up to them. 189 This
“brain drain” has serious economic consequences for this group of highly
skilled women. 190
Thus, Okin recognizes the interrelatedness of the public and private
spheres in assessing the economic situation of women as a class. She
eschews the notion that one must choose either the “human capital”
approach or the “workplace discrimination” explanation in determining why

many careers. Id. at 75. Women are also disproportionately affected by this fact in that their
partners are less willing to move for their careers or in that their careers are disrupted in
order to support their partners’ relocations. Id.
187
HEWLETT, supra note 173, at 13–16; WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 71–72, 79–81; see
also Sylvia Ann Hewlett, We Can Stop the Female Brain Drain, SUNDAY TIMES (London)
(Mar. 6, 2005), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article420087.ece (stating that the
“overwhelming evidence shows that women want to work—and work hard—but they find it
almost impossible to clone the unbroken, competitive model of work created by men”).
188
OKIN, supra note 25, at 148; see also Hewlett, supra note 173, at 36–37 (noting that
twenty-nine percent of women surveyed left their jobs because they were unsatisfying; these
numbers increased for women who worked in business and law: fifty-two percent and fiftynine percent, respectively).
189
OKIN, supra note 25, at 148; see also Hewlett, supra note 173, at 37 (“A new child or
a mother-in-law recently diagnosed with Alzheimers does not necessarily signal that a
woman will quit. Whether or not a woman off-ramps also has a whole lot to do with
whether an employer can conjure up support—and opportunities—in the workplace.”).
190
Obviously women who work full-time in the home become completely economically
dependent on their spouses, but the decision to take a “scenic route” in one’s career also has
consequences. Ninety-three percent of women surveyed who left their careers eventually
wanted to rejoin the workforce, but only seventy-four percent were able to do so. HEWLETT,
supra note 173, at 43. Of the group that was able to rejoin the workforce, only forty percent
were able to return to full-time positions. Id. Furthermore, on average, women lose eighteen
percent of their earning power when they leave the workforce, even for a short period of
time. Id. at 45. For those who spend three or more years outside of the workforce, they can
lose as much as thirty-seven percent of their earning power. Id. at 45; see also WILLIAMS,
supra note 161, at 73 (“Even if someone who has been working part time later takes a fulltime job, she (or he) is likely to earn far less than someone who always worked full time.”).
Williams also notes that workers who take advantage of “family friendly” part-time policies
are more at risk for marginalization in the workplace and ultimately complete termination.
WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 74–75.
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there are inequalities based on sex in the workplace.191 The human capital
approach explains this inequality based on the notion that women “choose”
to enter lower paying or more dead-end jobs because of expectations about
their family lives.192 The workplace discrimination explanation looks at
factors outside of the control of the female employee. 193 Because the public
and private spheres are interrelated, however, Okin recognizes that these
explanations complement one another: “A cycle of power relations and
decisions pervades both family and workplace, and the inequalities of each
reinforce those that already exist in the other.” 194
Furthermore, research on the effect of divorce on women underscores
the difficulty many women have maintaining economic independence
should they choose to separate from their partner. Generally speaking, after
divorce, women’s incomes fall substantially, while their husbands’ decline
more modestly, or in many cases, their incomes actually rise.195 As has
already been stated, many women make substantially less money than their
spouses in the workplace. Yet, because women usually get custody of their
children, they have larger economic needs than their husbands because of
their larger households. 196 Moreover, their work lives are constrained by
the needs of their children. 197 Thus, women who are already economically
constrained because of their lower paying jobs find that their ability to
improve their economic situation in the workplace is constrained by needs
in the home. 198

191
OKIN, supra note 25, at 146–47; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 37, 83–84
(arguing that the marginalization of women in the workplace is not just because of choice,
but it is also a result of discrimination).
192
OKIN, supra note 25, at 147.
193
Id.
194
Id.; WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 38–39 (noting how the organization of market and
family in American culture creates a “force field” that pulls women into “traditional gender
roles”) (emphasis added).
195
Pamela J. Smock, Wendy D. Manning & Sanjiv Gupta, The Effects of Marriage and
Divorce on Women’s Economic Well-Being, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 794, 794 (1999). But see
Matthew McKeever and Nicholas H. Wolfinger, Reexamining the Economic Costs of
Marital Disruption for Women, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 202, 215 (2001) (discussing findings that
suggest that women’s increased level of participation in the work force over the last several
years has improved the general economic condition of divorced women). Roughly forty
percent of divorced women live in poverty, and a disproportionate number of their children
“do not attain the educational level, or the class status, of their fathers.” WILLIAMS, supra
note 161, at 3.
196
OKIN, supra note 25, at 162.
197
Id.
198
In 2007, unmarried women workers without children made fourteen percent more
than married women with children. HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 163, at
2. In contrast, unmarried men with children made twelve percent more than unmarried men
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To be clear, I am not arguing that there are not women who choose to
become economically dependent on their husbands because they sincerely
want to spend more time with their children and on household duties.
Instead, I am arguing that because of the interrelatedness of the public and
private spheres, it is difficult to determine how much of this choice is also
influenced by the societal view that a good mother and wife should forgo
career ambition outside of the home and by the difficult realities of the
ideal-worker norm, which often includes sex discrimination and sexual
harassment.
I am also not arguing that every woman who is economically
dependent on her partner is necessarily disempowered by that choice. It
certainly can be the case that a couple determines that it is most efficient for
their household to divide the labor in such a way that the woman is
economically dependent on her partner, but her partner still respects her and
views her as an equal partner. The point of this analysis is not to deny the
possible existence of such a relationship. In addition, the point of this
analysis is not to suggest that women stay in abusive relationships only
because of economic dependence. As has already been discussed, there are
a variety of reasons why a woman may remain in an abusive relationship.199
Instead, the purpose of this analysis is to underscore that economic
dependence can make women more vulnerable to violence in relationships
that are abusive because it makes it more difficult for them to engage with
the criminal justice system or for them to leave the relationship should they
choose to do so. 200 Obviously, the criminal justice system is not equipped
to address the complexity of this issue. For that reason, while criminal
justice policies are important, it is also the case that domestic violence
policies that focus more on improving the economic conditions of women
will have a greater and longer lasting impact on many victims. 201
without children. Id.; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 2 (noting that single mothers
earn the lowest percentage of average men’s pay).
199
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
200
See supra Part III.C.2.a (discussing how a domestic violence victim faces a fifty
percent chance that her standard of living will drop below the poverty level should she
choose to leave her batterer and that nearly half of all homeless women and children have
fled violence in the home).
201
Some scholars have already begun proposing potential policies for improving the
economic conditions for women. For example, Susan Okin has argued that a partner who
has been able to maintain a career “largely unencumbered by domestic responsibilities”
should be responsible for supporting the other partner in the form of alimony and child
support for at least the number of years the division of labor took place. OKIN, supra note
25, at 183. Furthermore, she argues that “postdivorce households should enjoy the same
standard of living.” Id. (emphasis omitted). She also argues that shared household duties
between the sexes would require a change in the demands of work life, which is currently
based on the ideal-worker norm. Id. at 175–76. Similarly, Joan Williams advocates for a
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b. Intersectionality
Feminists of color recognized years ago that feminism must take into
account the intersectionality of race, class, sexuality, and gender in
women’s lives in order to have a complete picture of the subordination that
all women experience.202 Race can compound the economic disparities that
some domestic violence victims experience. In 2007, the median earnings
of full-time wage and salary African-American women workers was eightyfive percent of those earned by their Caucasian women counterparts.203 The
differential for Latina women was seventy-six percent. 204 Women of color
have been particularly harmed by the most recent economic recession.
They have taken out a disproportionate share of subprime loans. 205 In
addition, a disproportionate number of low-income African-American
women have been evicted from their homes. 206
Women of color also have their own specific challenges when dealing
with legal actors. First, they especially have been victimized by dual arrest
policies, 207 which provide that victims may be arrested along with their
perpetrators when the police claim that they cannot determine who the
aggressor in the attack was. 208 One of the reasons that African-American
restructuring of market work and family work so that the “ideal worker” can spend more
time on caregiving and work performed in the home is valued so that women and their
children are protected from economic vulnerability. WILLIAMS, supra note 161, at 56. She
also suggests a way to calculate “income equalization” between separated households postdivorce. Id. at 115–16, 129–31. Martha Fineman advocates the abolition of the legal
category of marriage and the “redistribution or reallocation of social and economic
subsidies” to the caregiver and her dependent, instead of to the “natural family.” MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228–33 (1995).
202
AUDRE LORDE, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in
SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS & SPEECHES 110, 110 (1984); Crenshaw, supra note 178, at 1241–
45; see also Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 585 (1990).
203
HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 163, at 8 tbl.1.
204
Id.
205
Heidi Hartman, Women, the Recession, and the Stimulus Package, DISSENT, Fall
2009, at 43.
206
Erik Eckholm, A Sight All Too Familiar in Poor Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2010, at A14.
207
Gruber, supra note 1, at 805–06; see also Sack, supra note 84, at 1680–81 (noting
that women of color are more likely to be arrested than Caucasian women are and are
charged with more serious crimes).
208
Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1171, 1185 (2002) (noting that many statutes have “primary aggressor” language that require
the police to determine who was the most significant aggressor). But see David Hirschel et
al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence
Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 296 (2007) (finding that
overall dual arrest rates are low in domestic violence cases, but also noting that there are
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women may be disproportionately affected by dual arrest policies is that
they tend to fight back against their abusers at higher rates than their
Caucasian counterparts. 209 Yet because of the stereotypical image of the
“angry black woman,” the police are more apt to view these acts as acts of
aggression instead of as acts of self-preservation. 210 In fact, Hillary Potter
found in her discussions with African-American victims that in cases where
they tried to physically defend themselves from their abusers, they were
hesitant to call the police because they were afraid that they might be
viewed as the aggressor, or at least as contributors to the abuse. 211
Donna Coker notes that women who are arrested risk losing custody of
their children, may be barred for life from receiving welfare benefits, and
may have student financial aid compromised. 212 She also notes that arrests
of immigrant women have also had disastrous effects because, not having
proper legal counsel, they often plea bargain in order to avoid jail time,
which can result in deportation.213 In addition, immigrant abusers may be
subject to deportation if they are convicted of a domestic violence crime,
which may be a result that many victims do not want, particularly if the
partner is the primary economic provider.214
Some women of color have also found that police officers doubted
their reports of abuse because physical evidence can be harder to see on
darker skin. 215 In addition, the “angry black woman” stereotype not only
applies to interactions with the police, but also to those interactions with
legal and court personnel, including judges.216
considerable variations in dual arrest rates both among and within states); Sack, supra note
84, at 1691 (arguing that discretionary policies would not solve the problem of victim arrest
and that they might actually make the problem worse).
209
POTTER, supra note 109, at 47. A study by Russell P. Dobash and R. Emerson
Dobash suggests that seventy-five percent of women who physically attacked their partners
were acting in self-defense. Id. at 119; see also Schneider, supra note 44, at 67 (stating that
most women arrested for domestic violence were actually acting in self-defense in
jurisdictions with mandatory arrest laws).
210
See POTTER, supra note 109, at 180.
211
Id.
212
Coker, supra note 1, at 839.
213
Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1048–49 (2000).
214
Id. But see Sack, supra note 84, at 1693 (arguing that discretionary policies will not
solve the problems that immigrant domestic violence victims face and that a better solution
is to directly address immigration policy rather than dismantling mandatory policies).
215
POTTER, supra note 109, at 178.
216
Id. at 183–84; see also Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered
Woman? When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 99–100 (2008) (discussing
how both the “angry black woman” or Sapphire stereotype and the promiscuous and
dishonest Jezebel stereotype make it difficult for African-American women who fight back
to get sympathy from judges and juries).
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Furthermore, women of color and immigrant women often want to
limit the amount of interaction they have with the criminal justice system
because of the history of poor interactions between this system and
communities of color and immigrant groups. Kimberle Crenshaw has noted
that these women do not want to “subject their private lives to the scrutiny
and control of a police force that is frequently hostile” to people of color.217
She argues that for members of racially subordinated groups, the home may
function as a “safe haven from the indignities of life in a racist society. . . .
[B]ut for this ‘safe haven,’ in many cases women of color victimized by
violence might otherwise seek help.” 218 Similarly, lesbians also are hesitant
to seek out help from the criminal justice system because of a fear of the
discrimination and “the sensationalism frequently visited on same-sex
couples.” 219 Lesbian victims who fight back against their abusive partners
also tend to get less sympathy from legal actors.220
In addition, many African-American women may feel pressure to
conceal the violence they experience because they want to limit racial
stereotyping against African-American men. 221 Similarly, some Asian and
Latina women hide the violence they experience at home in order to avoid
shaming their families.222 Hillary Potter found that the African-American
women she spoke with were hesitant to engage with the criminal justice
system because of the imbalance in punishment imposed upon defendants
based on race. 223 Indeed, Donna Coker has noted that disproportionately
high numbers of African-American and Latino men are subject to criminal
justice intervention in domestic violence cases. 224 In addition, because of
the prevalence of police brutality against African-American men, some

217
Crenshaw, supra note 178, at 1257. But see supra note 109 and accompanying text
(suggesting that some African-American women support criminal justice intervention).
218
Crenshaw, supra note 178, at 1257. But see also supra note 109 and accompanying
text (discussing studies that show that many African-American women do desire that their
batterers be prosecuted).
219
Weissman, supra note 83, at 401; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 68–70. It is
important to note that the existence of domestic violence in same-sex relationships suggests
that the traditional patriarchal analysis of domestic violence may be incomplete. Id. This
fact underscores the importance of theorization that considers the intersectionality of various
factors in domestic violence victim’s lives so that appropriate policies can be created that
protected a larger segment of victims.
220
Goodmark, supra note 216, at 112–13 (suggesting that the police may not be willing
to intervene because they view the violence in same-sex cases as mutual).
221
Crenshaw, supra note 178, at 1257.
222
Id.; SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 64.
223
POTTER, supra note 109, at 174.
224
Coker, supra note 213, at 1034–45.
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women are worried about how their partners will be treated by the police. 225
Because incarceration in general has had disproportionate effects on the
poor, communities of color, and immigrant groups, Aya Gruber has been
particularly critical of the current focus on arrest and prosecution within
mandatory policies. 226
Empirical research further supports the argument that an examination
of the intersectionality of victims’ identities is an important aspect of
creating domestic violence policy. Many have concerns about mandatory
arrest and prosecution policies given the fact that there is evidence that
arrest and prosecution may not deter future violent conduct and that they
may actually put some victims in more danger. Support for the view that
mandatory arrest could serve as a deterrent for batterers was originally
supported by an early study conducted by Lawrence Sherman in the early
1980s. At that time, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) supported
Sherman’s study of the Minneapolis Police Department, which involved a
field experiment of misdemeanor spousal abuse with three intervention
strategies: arrest, ordering the suspect away from the scene for twenty-four
hours, and trying to restore order. 227 Based on the results from this
experiment, Sherman concluded that arrest was the most effective treatment
in reducing the likelihood of renewed violence. 228
Sherman ended up questioning the results from his original study,
however. After his initial study in Minneapolis, the NIJ funded replication
studies in six different cities. 229 The results from the experiments in
Omaha, Nebraska and Charlotte, North Carolina suggested that arrest was
no more of a deterrent than other types of police responses, such as
separation or mediation.230 The results from the experiment in Milwaukee
suggested arrest reduced the likelihood of renewed violence for employed,
married, Caucasian suspects who were high school graduates, but increased
225
POTTER, supra note 109, at 175. Interestingly enough, Potter did not find that the
women she spoke with felt guilty about the prospect of putting “another Black man” through
the criminal justice system. Id. They seemed more concerned about taking their children’s
father, anger from the batterer, or removing extra income. Id.
226
Gruber, supra note 1, at 798. But see Sack, supra note 84, at 1690 (arguing that
discrimination against the poor and people of color would be worse under discretionary
versus mandatory policies).
227
Richard A. Berk et al., Studies: A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse
Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 170–71 (1992).
228
Id.
229
Id. at 173–74; Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on
Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 168 (1992).
230
Berk, supra note 227, at 171–72; J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, III, Female
Spouse Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 115 (1992).

2010]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

1293

the likelihood of renewed violence for unemployed, unmarried, AfricanAmerican suspects who were high school dropouts. 231 It should be noted
that these replication studies have been criticized.232 Thus, at this point it is
not clear how effective arrest is as a deterrent for future violence in a
relationship, but the replication studies suggest that class and race are
important considerations in determining the effectiveness of mandatory
policies.
Some may argue that issues related to race, class, and sexuality can be
addressed by creating programs that encourage greater sensitivity within the
criminal justice system. These types of efforts are certainly important, but
as is the case with the economic disparities that women experience as a
class, a comprehensive solution to racism, classism, and sexism is clearly
beyond the scope of the criminal justice system. I do not raise this issue to
suggest that the criminal justice system has no value in addressing domestic
violence against women of color, but it is important to recognize the
challenges of using a criminal justice solution in certain communities.
Given that these challenges may cause some victims not to engage with the
criminal justice system at all, a broader approach that includes solutions
outside of the criminal justice system is critical in providing support for a
larger group of victims.

231

Berk, supra note 227, at 173–74; see also Sherman et al., supra note 229, at 168.
Joan Zorza has criticized the validity of the replication studies arguing that none of
them fully replicated the original Minneapolis study or each other, each study had its own
definition of a domestic relationship, and the type of police responses used in each study
differed. Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: Why It May Prove the Best
First Step in Curbing Repeat Abuse, 10 CRIM. JUST. 2, 4–5 (1995). Critics of the NIJ studies
also argue that it is incorrect to assume that renewed violence is a retaliatory response to
arrest when the NIJ studies showed fewer re-offenses in the short term, and those treating
batterers believe any retaliation from arrest would happen shortly after arrest. Id. at 8; see
also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Commentaries, The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique,
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201, 204 (1992) (arguing that the lower recidivism rate for
employed men may be because their partners do not report future violence out of fear of
sacrificing their lifestyle and status); Coker, supra note 1, at 856 (citing study that reviewed
the NIJ arrest study data in Milwaukee and that concluded that residence in the most
marginalized neighborhoods is a stronger predictor of increased violence following arrest
than unemployment status); Lisa A. Frisch, Research that Succeeds, Policies that Fail, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 209, 213 (1992). But see Sack, supra note 84, at 1677–78 (noting
that an important criticism of the NIJ replication studies is that they do not “examine the
impact of the arrest policy in the context of other components of the justice system, such as
prosecution and conviction rates, sentencing and monitoring policies, and access to services
for victims” and stating that more recent reanalysis of the NIJ replication studies shows that
there is a reduction in recidivism among domestic violence offenders who are arrested).
232
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IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE REFORM
Developing a global solution to the domestic violence problem is
beyond the scope of this Article. Using the personal experiences of
domestic violence victims as a starting point, however, this Part will
provide some thoughts about considerations that should be made with
respect to future reform.
A. REFORM WITHIN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

An important step with respect to criminal justice reform is to directly
address some of the inadequacies that domestic violence victims are
currently experiencing within the criminal justice system. There are
jurisdictions that have already begun to make such reforms. For example,
in Washington, D.C., in order to enhance victim safety, the courtrooms
dedicated to domestic violence cases as part of the Domestic Violence Unit
are staffed with several security guards. 233 In addition, the Domestic
Violence Intake Center, which is on-site at the courthouse, houses
advocates who help victims with safety planning. 234 The U.S. Attorney’s
Office also runs a program that focuses on high-risk offenders and that
collaborates with advocates who work with the victims in these cases.235
Furthermore, the Domestic Violence Unit seeks to improve victims’
experiences with the legal system and to keep them better informed about
the legal process. For example, independent victim advocates are present in
the courtroom to assist victims during the court process. 236 The Intake
Center is also staffed by independent victim advocacy organizations, the
Office of Corporate Counsel, and prosecutors and advocates from the U.S.
Attorney’s Office who address victims’ civil court and criminal justice
needs in one place. 237 Victims’ needs for material resources are also
addressed in the Intake Center where representatives from victim advocacy
organizations provide emergency services and referrals to multiple service
organizations. 238

233

EMILY SACK, CREATING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT: GUIDELINES
PRACTICES 55 (Lindsey Anderson et al. eds., 2002).
234
Id. at 57.
235
Id.
236
Id. at 55.
237
Id. at 57.
238
Id.

AND

BEST
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In addition to Washington, D.C., many other jurisdictions have also
improved coordination among courts, domestic violence organizations, and
social service agencies.239 Chicago has implemented the Target Abuser
Call (TAC) program. 240 In 2004, the Department of Justice awarded over
$20 million for the creation of Family Justice Centers around the country,
which all also implement a coordinated community response.241 In July
2005, one such center was opened in Brooklyn. 242 In addition to
implementing a coordinated community response, Brooklyn also has taken
advantage of technological advances. ADT Securities Systems has donated
electronic alarm pendants to some of the most severely at-risk victims. 243
These pendants “send[] a level-two response through the 911 police
emergency system, the same response used for a police officer in need of
assistance.” 244 Donated cell phones have also been distributed to some atrisk victims that have a speed dial connection to 911.245
Preliminary research thus far suggests that a coordinated response
between all parts of the criminal justice system and community-based
organizations is a promising response to domestic violence at this time. 246
In addition, these types of programs appear to have higher victim
participation rates.247 Thus, it may be the case that victims’ participation
rates may be increased by directly addressing the reasons why they
ordinarily choose not to engage with the criminal justice system. Moreover,
if more victims participate in the prosecution of their batterers, it may be the

239

Sack, supra note 84, at 1724–28.
Bailey, supra note 90, at 49.
241
Sack, supra note 84, at 1730; see also Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L FAM. JUST.
CENTER ALLIANCE, http://www.familyjusticecenter.org/index.php/faqs/fjcs/frequently-askedquestion.php (last visited June 30, 2009).
242
Charles J. Hynes, Combating and Preventing Domestic Violence, CRIM. JUST., Spring
2010, at 47.
243
Id. at 46.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Sack, supra note 84, at 1726–28; see also GARLAND, supra note 74, at 205 (arguing
that true crime control in modern society must involve coordination between the state, local
organizations, and communities).
247
For example, when adequately funded, as many as eighty percent of TAC victims
participate in the prosecution of their batterers. Bailey, supra note 90, at 50. In a study of
randomly selected cases from the TAC program and the General Court in Chicago, seventythree percent of the TAC victims participated in the prosecution of their batterers, compared
to a forty percent participation rate in General Court. CAROLYN COPPS HARTLEY & LISA
FROHMANN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE COOK COUNTY TARGET ABUSER CALL (TAC): AN
EVALUATION OF A SPECIALIZED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT 4 (2003), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/202944.pdf.
240
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case that more legal actors would be motivated to respond to victims’ cries
for help, even without strict mandatory policies.248
On a practical level, however, funding is going to be a serious
impediment to developing coordinated community response programs in
many jurisdictions. Thus, jurisdictions may have to implement them on a
small-scale level. 249 Yet, even small-scale programs that help only some
domestic violence victims are better than no changes at all.
Even with an increase in resources, however, it is not clear that these
types of programs are going to be successful for all victims. It could be the
case that these types of programs will work best for high-risk cases where
victims are in extreme danger, rather than for less severe cases.250 In her
discussions with African-American domestic violence victims, Hillary
Potter found that few of them cited fear of further injury as a reason why
they did not leave their batterer. She did find, however, that fear actually is
often an impetus to finally get out of a violent situation. 251 Scholars also
need to further research whether these programs, particularly those that are
focused on prosecution of the batterer, are not coercing victims in ways that
undermine their level of satisfaction with the criminal justice system. 252
Finally, as discussed in the Part III, efforts need to be made to improve
relationships between the criminal justice system and poor communities and
communities of color.

248

Some argue that mandatory policies are necessary to keep legal actors responsive to
domestic violence victims’ cries for help. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
249
In fact, TAC’s focus on high-risk misdemeanor cases means that most domestic
violence cases in Chicago do not go through this program. In 2003, it was reported that
TAC only took in about 1,920 cases per year. Bailey, supra note 90, at 52 n.331. It is
estimated that Chicago has as many as 70,000 domestic violence cases per year. Id.
Funding for TAC from government grants has been reduced since the program’s inception.
Id.
250
TAC looks for repeat offenders at the misdemeanor level in order to stem violence
before it escalates. A focus group of lethality experts came up with a list of high-risk factors
for escalating violence: strangulation, resisting arrest, violation of orders of protection, status
of the relationship, public incidents of violence, and stressors. The most important factor is
whether the victim has indicated that she wants to end the relationship. Bailey, supra note
90, at 50. In a study of randomly selected cases from the TAC program and the General
Court in Chicago, “TAC women were significantly more likely to report prior defendant
threats to kill and use of knife and gun in assaults than General women . . . .” HARTLEY &
FROHMANN, supra note 247, at 2.
251
POTTER, supra note 109, at 145.
252
Research suggests that participants in the TAC program have a higher level of
satisfaction with legal actors in the criminal justice system than victims who are part of the
General Court system in Chicago. HARTLEY & FROHMANN, supra note 247, at 3.
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B. NOT ALL INTIMATE VIOLENCE IS THE SAME.

Empirical research suggests that not all of the violence that occurs in
intimate relationships is the same, which is an important consideration for
future domestic violence policy. 253 Most of this Article has focused on the
Coercive Controlling Violence model of abuse, which is the model that
most people have in mind when they think about domestic violence. Under
this model, physical violence is part of a larger pattern of control,
intimidation, and emotional abuse that the abuser wields over his partner.254
The vast majority of the victims under this model are women. 255 In
addition, the violence is more frequent and severe under the Coercive
Controlling Violence model than in other types of intimate partner
violence. 256 Male abusers are often characterized as having misogynistic
tendencies in this category as well. 257
In contrast, Situational Couple Violence does not have the same type
of pattern of intimidation and control that the Coercive Control Model
has. 258 Instead, this model involves specific situations or arguments that
have escalated into violence. 259 Unlike, the Coercive Control Model, men
and women equally engage in violence in the Situational Couple Violence
model. 260 Fear of the partner is not characteristic of this type of violence,
and men engaged in Situation Control Violence do not differ from
nonviolent men on measurements of misogyny. 261 While the violence that
can occur under this model can sometimes be severe, in most cases it is less
likely to escalate over time in the same way that the Coercive Controlling
Violence model does, it sometimes stops altogether, and it is more likely to
stop after separation. 262
Separation-Instigated Violence occurs as a result of a separation in the
relationship, but it differs from Coercive Controlling Violence in that there
was not a history of abuse or violence in the relationship.263 Violence can
range from mild to severe, and it typically entails only one or two acts of

253

Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate
Partner Violence: Research Update & Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476,
476–77 (2008).
254
Id. at 481–82.
255
Id. at 481.
256
Id. at 482.
257
Id. at 485.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id. at 486.
263
Id. at 487.
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violence at the beginning or during the separation period. 264 Both men and
women engage in this type of violence, and parties typically comply with
orders of protections that are issued against them to stop the violence.265
Current criminal justice policies seemed to be designed with the
Coercive Controlling Violence model in mind. While most of the cases that
come in contact with the criminal justice system probably involve this
model, empirical studies suggest that a significant number probably involve
other types of violence.266 Even if one assumes that mandatory policies are
the best approach for the Coercive Controlling Violence model, it may not
be the case that it is the best approach for other types of violence. In
addition, dual arrest policies seem to wrongfully arrest many women who
are actually defending themselves or who are engaged in what has been
called Violent Resistance.267 Future domestic violence policy should
acknowledge, therefore, the differences in the types of violence that can
occur in intimate relationships in order to more effectively address each
type of violence and in order to make sure that those who are defending
themselves are not being punished unjustly.
C. PRIVACY

Because of the special nature of intimate relationships, some victims
may view the violence in their home as a personal matter in the sense that
they do not want criminal justice intervention under any circumstances. 268
Indeed, according to results from National Crime Surveys of Victimization
conducted between 2001 and 2005, privacy is the most frequently cited
reason for not reporting domestic violence.269 It may be the case that this
statistic would change if domestic violence laws and policies were to
address the economic realities of women and the negative interactions
between domestic violence victims and legal actors. But it also may be the
case that some victims will always want their family lives to stay outside of
the criminal justice system. Interactions with the criminal justice system
can have the effect of separating families and of subjecting families to

264

Id.
Id.
266
Id. at 482.
267
Id. at 484–85.
268
See Baker, supra note 79, at 1483 (“Most people would rather think of their families
and personal lives as private . . . the battered women’s movement must be sensitive to how
difficult it is for abused women to let go of an identity and private space that those lucky
enough not to be in abusive relationship can still cherish.”)
269
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES 28 (2007). According to this report, 22% of female victims cited
privacy as the reason for not reporting intimate violence. Id.
265
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humiliating state scrutiny. Thus, it makes sense that some women may
view a criminal justice solution to the violence they experience in their lives
as an invasion of their privacy.
While it is important to understand the political nature of private
violence and to provide political solutions to this violence, many women
are not seeking out any help at all because they are not comfortable with the
public nature of the criminal justice system. Perhaps a more grassroots
approach, similar to the early battered women’s movement, that focuses on
networks of supportive individuals who can provide victims with material
and emotional support might be more appealing to some victims. This type
of approach gives victims access to help outside of the home, but it also
allows for more privacy than a criminal justice response, which creates a
public record of a family’s home life. Unless this desire for privacy is
acknowledged and further explored, a significant number of women will
continue to be alienated and to suffer from private violence in silence. 270
V. CONCLUSION
By arguing that the personal is political, feminists challenged the
notion that domestic violence is a private matter that should be handled
within the family. Instead, they argued that violence in the home is the
result of the political disempowerment of women as a class. As a result,
this violence is appropriate for political analysis and regulation.
Furthermore, by not regulating this violence, the state is complicit in the
subordination of women in their homes. Participants of the early battered
women’s movement saw a role for the criminal justice system in addressing
this problem, but they envisioned that victims would have autonomy in
determining when this system would intervene in their lives. This vision of
autonomy, however, is not translatable within the current criminal justice
system.
Acknowledging that complete victim autonomy is not the primary
objective of the criminal justice system, however, does not mean that
proponents of current criminal justice policies should not be alarmed by the
fact that such a high number of domestic violence victims do not want to
engage with the criminal justice system. Indeed, the limited number of
victims who desire to engage with this system is an important metric in
determining the criminal justice system’s effectiveness. It underscores that
improvements need to be made in the interactions that victims have with the
system. It also highlights the fact that the criminal justice system is a
limited tool in addressing what is a social, political, and economic problem.
Future policies should improve upon the experiences that victims have
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engaging with the criminal justice system. They also should address the
economic disparities that women experience as a class and the
intersectionality of race, class, sexuality, and gender. Finally, future
policies should acknowledge that not all intimate violence falls under the
Coercive Controlling Violence model and that the invasive nature of the
criminal justice system may cause some victims to seek out less public
solutions to the violence they experience in their lives.

